Year 1900-1949
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1917: The coalmine Sveagruvan opens in Spitsbergen, Svalbard
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1932: First navigation of the Northern Sea Route without wintering
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1940: German Hilfskreuzer Komet navigates the Northern Sea Route en route to the Pacific Ocean
1909-1917:
Difficult sea ice conditions around 
Steamship Neptun in packice at Spitsbergen, summer 1909. Picture source: Anders Beer Wilse, Norsk Folkemuseum.
In
connection with a detailed description of the Swedish mining and exploration activities (coal)
in
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July 7, 1909 : The Billefjord is blocked by ice. First ship makes it to Pyramiden in innermost Billefjord July 12.
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September 1910: Geological expedition lead by Ernest Mansfield (The Northern Exploration Co., Ltd.,
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August 11, 1912 : Braganzavågen in Van Mijenfjorden is closed by ice. Also Bellsund is blocked by ice.
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July 1915: An expedition lead by Birger Johnsson finds the west coast of
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July-August 1917: Difficult sea ice conditions in Van Milenfjorden made it impossible for the steamship D/S Amsterdam to reach Braganzavågen, innermost Van Mijenfjord, before early August (see below).
Click here to see the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) meteorological series since 1912.
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Titanic leaving Southampton 10 April 1912 (left), foundering 15 April (centre), and sitting 3821 m below the surface of the North Atlantic (right).
Around 10:30 PM 14 April 1912 the new passenger liner Titanic on her maiden voyage to New York was steaming with about 22.5 knots across a calm sea in a clear and cold night about 400 km SE of Newfoundland. Both the air temperature and sea temperature had been dropping to a degree below freezing during the last hour. Less than 19 miles further to the west was a dense field of floating ice floes and icebergs. Almost at the same time Captain Stanley Lord, master of the freighter Californian, became thoroughly chocked as his ship with engines in full reverse rammed into this field of floating ice. Californian was lucky to escape damage, but was sitting still in the ice for the night. At 11:40 PM an iceberg in this fatal ice field was sighted less than 900 m directly in front of Titanic. First Officer W.M. Murdoch on Titanic reacted spontaneously and in all likelihood came very close to saving the ship by a rapid port-around manoeuvre, ordering first full rudder to port and half a minute later hard to starboard, thereby swerving the liner around the iceberg in an S-shaped manoeuvre. His intention was of cause to protect the all-important midship section of the hull with boilers and engines against serious damage. Presumably Murdoch actually succeeded in porting around the iceberg, but by doing this Titanic ran across an underwater extension of the iceberg and received damage to her bottom. Captain Edward J. Smith's following decision to resume steaming with reduced speed is likely to have been the actual dead sentence for the liner; the forward movement forcing large amounts of water through her damaged bottom into the hull, more than the pumps were able to cope with (Brown 2001).
Surface air temperature anomaly January-April 1912, compared to average 1900-1911. Data source: GISS. Titanics final position SE of Newfoundland is shown by a red dot. Data source: NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS).
Presumably
the dense field of ice floes and icebergs SE of Newfoundland came as a surprise to
Captain Smith on the fatal voyage with the Titanic. From the surface air temperature map above it
is apparent that temperature conditions January-April 1912 in this part of the
North Atlantic were several degrees below what would have been considered
‘normal’ since 1900. The warm region extending across
It is very likely that the fatal iceberg was produced by the most productive calving outlet glacier in Greenland, the Jakobshavn Isbræ.
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1917:
The coalmine Sveagruvan opens in Spitsbergen, Svalbard
Steamship D/S Amsterdam in Braganzavågen, innermost Van Mijenfjorden, early August 1917 (right). Photo by A. Reuterskiöld.
The First World War (The Great
War; 1914-1918) resulted in a global lack of coal for energy production, and
coal prizes increased rapidly. The Swedish mining company Aktiebolaget
Spetsbergens Svenska Kolfä
The expedition left Stockholm in Sweden early July 1917 on the steamship D/S Amsterdam, but difficult sea ice conditions in Van Mijenfjorden made it impossible to reach Braganzavågen before early August (see photo above). With little doubt the summer of 1917 must have been cold compared to early 21st century conditions, as is shown by the many floes of sea ice. Today, the last floes of the winter sea ice usually melts long before August. Also the fresh snow seen in the picture is noteworthy. Snow must have been falling at low altitudes shortly before the photo was taken. The cold character of the year 1917 is clearly shown by the official Svalbard temperature record since 1912 (click here to see the entire Svalbard meteorological record), which shows all seasons of the year 1917 to be cold in comparison with previous and following years. The warming from 1917 to 1922 must indeed have been rapid in this part of the Arctic.
Under direction of Director Granholm the first buildings in the mining settlement Svea were constructed, and parts of the coming harbour for shipment of coal were established. Geological surveying was carried out in the area around the mine. About 50 persons stayed over winter along with Director Granholm, and 4,000 tonnes coal was produced, somewhat below the initial estimate of 25,000 tonnes (Hoel 1966). A layer of clay stone just above the coal layer often collapsed when the coal was removed, and it proved difficult to avoid mixing of clay stone and coal.
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1919-1925:
Improving sea ice conditions around
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1919: The Swedish coal mine Sveagruvan in innermost Van Mijenfjorden is able to ship no less than 20,000 tonnes of coal, partly because of unusual fine sea ice conditions during the summer of 1919.
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1920: The harbour at Sveagruvan is open for shipping in 98 days.
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1921: The harbour at Sveagruvan is open for shipping in only 85 days because of difficult sea ice conditions.
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1922: The harbour at Sveagruvan is open for shipping in 92 days. Sea ice conditions is described as ‘normal’. Report on Arctic Warming in the journal Monthly Weather Review October 10, 1922.
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1923: The harbour at Sveagruvan is open for shipping in 97 days. Sea ice conditions is described as ‘normal’.
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1924: The harbour at Sveagruvan is open for shipping from 9 July to 21 October (105 days). Sea ice conditions is described as ‘normal’.
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1925: The harbour at Sveagruvan is open for shipping from 3 July to 6 October (96 days). This year the Van Mijenfjord is still free of ice when the last ship leaves October 6.
Click here to see the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) meteorological series since 1912.
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1922:
The changing Arctic; warming in Spitsbergen
Docent Adolf Hoel in his office (left). Longyearbyen with coal mine installations around 1918 (right).
The Arctic seems to be warming up, states George Nicolas Ifft in 1922. He was at that time American consul at Bergen, Norway, and submitted from time to times reports to the the State Department, Washington, D.C. The following text represents an extract from his report, which was published in the journal Monthly Weather Review October 10, 1922.
"The Arctic seems to be warming up. Reports from fishermen, seal hunters, and explores who sail the seas about Spitsbergen and the eastern Arctic, all point to a radical change in climatic conditions, and hitherto unheard-of high temperatures in that part of the earth's surface.
In August, 1922, the Norwegian Department of Commerce sent an expedition to Spitsbergen and Bear Island under the leadership of Dr. Adolf Hoel, lecturer on geology at the University of Christiania. Its purpose was to survey and chart the lands adjacent to the Norwegian mines on those islands, take soundings of the adjacent waters, and make other oceanographic investigations.
Dr. Hoel, who has just returned, reports the location of hitherto unknown coal deposits on the eastern shores of Advent Bay - deposits of vast extent and superior quality......The oceanographic observations have, however, been even more interesting. Ice conditions were exceptional. In fact, so little ice has never before been noted. The expedition all but established a record, sailing as far north as 81o29' in ice-free water. This is the farthest north ever reached with modern oceanographic apparatus.....
In connection with Dr. Hoel's report, it is of interest to note the unusually warm summer in Arctic Norway and the observations of Capt. Martin Ingebrigtsen, who has sailed the eastern Arctic for 54 years past. He says that he first noted warmer conditions in 1918, that since that time it has steadily gotten warmer, and that to-day the Arctic of that region is not recognizable as the same region of 1868 to 1917.
Many old landmarks are so changed as to be unrecognisable. Where formerly great masses of ice were found, there are now often moraines, accumulations of earth and stones. At many points where glaciers formerly extended far into the sea they have entirely disappeared.
The change in temperature, says Captain Ingebrigtsen, has also brought about great change in the flora and fauna of the Arctic. This summer he sought for white fish in Spitsbergen waters. Formerly great shoals of them were found there. This year he saw none, although he visited all the old fishing grounds.
There were few seal in Spitzbergen waters this year, the catch being far under the average. This, however, did not surprise the captain. He pointed out that formerly the waters about Spitzbergen held an even summer temperature of about 3o Celsius; this year recorded temperatures up to 15o, and last winter the ocean did not freeze over even on the north coast of Spitsbergen.
With the disappearance of white fish and seal has come other life in these waters. This year herring in great shoals were found along the west coast of Spitsbergen, all the way from the fry to the veritable great herring. Shoals of smelt were also met with."
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1930:
Birkeland draws attention to Arctic warming
One of the first scientists to publish in a scientific journal considerations on the ongoing warming in the Arctic around Svalbard was the Norwegian scientist Birkeland (1930). Apparently he was surprised to see the considerable temperature increase 1917-1923, and stated in his paper that "I would like to stress that the mean deviation results in very high figures, probably the greatest yet known on Earth".
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1932:
First navigation of the Northern Sea Route without wintering
Alexandr Sibiryakov in sea ice
(left). Map showing temperatures June-August 1932, compared to the average
1900-1929 (right). The high air temperatures at the critical
point in the
The ship Sibiryakov
was was built in 1909 in
Sibiryakov
remained in service until August 1942, where she met and was sunk by the German pocket battle ship Admiral Scheer, after an unequal fight. The
impressive feat of making the first crossing without wintering was assisted by a
reduced sea ice cover following the Arctic warming after 1920. The critical
point in the passage of the
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1939-1940:
The Finnish-USSR winter war 
Frozen Red Army soldiers lying among deserted military vehicles in eastern Finland, December 1939 (left). Finnish machine gun team at Taipale on the Karelian front in southern Finland, January 1940 (center). Finnish areas lost to USSR by the Moscow Peace Treaty March 1940 (right).
The
Winter War began when the Soviet Union (USSR) attacked
On
Finland
was able to mobilize an army
of 180,000 men. These troops turned out to be highly efficient with fast moving
groups of ski troops, often lead by commanders with local knowledge of the
terrain. In addition, several Finnish commanders developed a small-unit
surrounding “motti” tactics, cutting of the columns of
The
winter 1939-40 became unusually cold in
Map showing the deviation of the average surface air temperature December 1939-February 1940, compared to average conditions 1929-1938. Western Russia and Europe was exposed to very low temperatures during the winter 1939-1940, compared to the previous 10 years (1929-1938). The Finnish-USSR winter war was fought in the very centre of maximum cooling. At the same time, the winter in easternmost Siberia, Alaska and Canada was warmer than the previous 10-yr average. Data source: NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS).
Soviet losses on the fronts
became tremendously large, and the country's international standing suffered
substantially. In the end, the general fighting ability of the Red Army was put
into question, a fact that presumably contributed to Adolf Hitler’s decision
to launch Operation
Barbarossa in June 1941.
Finland
was able to defend itself successfully until February 1940. By then,
however, it became clear that the Finnish forces were becoming exhausted, and
the Red Army had managed to penetrate the main Finnish line of defence, the
Mannerheim Line, at several places (Trotter
1991). German representatives therefore suggested that
In March 1940 the Moscow
Peace Treaty was signed, ceding about 9% of
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1940:
German Hilfskreuzer Komet navigates the Northern Sea Route en route to the
Pacific Ocean
The German auxiliary cruiser Komet,
3287 BRT (upper left). Route taken by Komet during its 516 days of operation at
sea 1940-1941, virtually taking
the ship from pole to pole (lower left). Map showing temperatures June-August
1940, compared to the average
1900-1929 (right). The high air temperatures along the
As a move against the British
naval superiority, the German navy equipped a number of Hilfskreuzers, or
auxiliary cruisers, former freighters converted into armed raiders. One of these,
KMS Komet, commanded by Kapitän zur See (later Vice Admiral)
Robert Eyssen, managed with Russian help to penetrate the NE Passage north of
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1941: Operation Barbarossa,
the German invasion of USSR
German Panzers in southern Russia July 1941 (left). Map showing the German advance until December 1941.
At
Summer, the season in which Operation Barbarossa began, was the most favourable period for military operations in European Russia. Days were long and warm, nights pleasantly cool, and only in the southern regions was the heat intense. Moors and swamps dried up, and all roads were easily passable. River discharge and water depth went down, making river crossings feasible without major problems. All arms, therefore, enjoyed optimum mobility. Even in summer, however, sudden thunderstorms could almost instantly change passable unpaved roads and open terrain into mud traps. Once the rain ended, dirt roads would dry out rapidly and could again be used by vehicles, provided that overeager drivers had not ploughed them up while still soft. During the dry periods dust often wreaked havoc on motor vehicles, clogging dust filters. But on the whole, the summer season was optimal for mobile warfare.
Spectacular German successes therefore characterized the initial phase of the Barbarossa campaign. Despite local hard Russian resistance, advances were swift. Then, from early August, the appearance of new Russian tanks superior to the German Panzers, began to slow the German advance. The German Army, even though outnumbered by the Soviet Army in soldiers, artillery and armed vehicles, still remained superior on the tactical level, and kept on pressing forward in a number of offensives. Northeast of Kiev a huge Soviet Army group 12th September were surrounded and taken prisoner in the largest encirclement achieved by either side in the entire campaign. More than 600,000 Russian soldiers were send into captivity. Nearly one third of the Soviet Army, as it had been at the outbreak of the war, was now eliminated. But notwithstanding such military successes, Adolf Hitler and the German High Command alike were taken aback by the continued strength of the Russian resistance. It became clear to them that they greatly had underestimated the number of enemy tanks and the ability of USSR to feed new divisions and new technology into the battle.
During their retreat, what they could not evacuate, the Soviet Army destroyed. Thousands of mines, steelworks and engineering plants were abandoned. Food that could not be transported was torched. By the end of 1941 the total Soviet production sank to a mere fraction of the level attained before the German invasion. The overall levels of output were never restored throughout the conflict withy Germany. The Soviet war effort, however, was sustained on the remarkable expansion of armaments and heavy-industrial output in the Urals and beyond (Overy 2006).
The victory at Kiev had encouraged many of the German General Staff to believe that one more Kesselschlact would finish the Russian Army off. October 1941, however, brought a very early onset of Winter in Russia, a few days earlier than experienced by Napoleon in 1812. On 7th October the first snow fell in western Russia. It melted rapidly, but it provoked Generaloberst Heinz Guderian to send the German Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht; OKW) an enquiry for winter clothing. He was told that he would receive it in due course, and "not to make further unnecessary requests of this type". Guderian's army group never received any winter clothing.
Early October major German offensives were launched toward Vyazma and Bryansk 250 km southwest of Moscow. On the third day a complete break-through was accomplished, and the road to Moscow appeared wide open. Weather forecasts were, however, unfavourable and the figures for German vehicle breakdown disquietingly high. During the last three weeks of October adverse weather conditions with heavy rain, snow showers, damp and penetrating mists made movement almost impossible on two days out of three (Clark 1995).
The German army had no conception of mud as it exists in European Russia. Hitler and the OKW still believed that the mud could be conquered by brute force, an idea that lead to serious losses of vehicles and equipment. Motor vehicles broke down with clutch or engine trouble. Horses became exhausted and collapsed. Few Panzers was still operational. Large-scale operations quickly became impossible. The muddy October season 1941 probably was more severe than any other muddy season experienced during the whole German-Russian conflict in World War II (Raus 2003). Presumably the extreme mud period 10-25 October 1941 contributed as much as the following unusual cold winter to the failure of Operation Barbarossa.
A sudden frost in late October cemented one of the German 6th Panzer Division's crippled panzer columns in frozen mud, and it never again moved (Raus 2003). For the still operational units, however, the frost once again made mobile operations possible, and the German Army resumed the advance towards Moscow. Blizzards and the increasing cold, however, made the conditions for the ordinary German line divisions verging on the impossible. Many of the German soldiers were without any clothing to supplement their uniforms except denim combat overalls. The impact of the cold was intensified by the complete absence of shelter; the ground was impossible hard to dig, and most of the buildings had been destroyed in the fighting or burned by the retreating Russians. The engines of the German Panzers and other vehicles has to be run more or less continuously, in order to protect them from freezing. The state of the German fuel supplies rapidly became wretched.
Map showing the deviation of the average surface air temperature December 1941, compared to average conditions 1930-1939. Russia and Siberia was exposed to very low temperatures, compared to the meteorological planning horizon for Operation Barbarossa (1930-1939). At the same time, UK, USA and huge areas of Canada enjoyed above average temperatures. Data source: NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS).
Hard Russian resistance
and the cold winter finally brought Operation Barbarossa to a halt in the
vicinity of
General Raus, who was rapidly earning himself a reputation as one of the German army's foremost tacticians of armoured warfare, recorded the daily mean temperature near Moscow during the first part of December 1941 as follows (Raus 2003): 1 December -7oC, 2 December -6oC, 3 December -9oC, 4 December -36oC, 5 December -37oC, 6 December -37oC, 7 December -6oC, 8 December -8oC. Later in December temperatures again fell to no less than -45oC, and General Raus's 6th Panzer Division reported moderate and severe frostbite cases at the rate of 800 per day. The lowest temperature reported during the entire Russian campaign was -53oC, measured northwest of Moscow on 26 January (Raus 2003).
There is no reason to distrust this information on air temperatures. Contrary to common belief, German panzer divisions were not made up by panzer regiments only, but also integrated a suite of other type of units like infantry regiments, motorcycle battalions and artillery regiments. And any artillery regiment would be accompanied by meteorological units, which by balloons and other means measured temperature and wind from ground level to several kilometres altitude, to enable calculation of correct firing data. The trajectory of long-range artillery grenades would easily take them 5-6 km into the troposphere, or higher. So, in all likelihood, the information on air temperatures were measured by people with meteorological training, using proper equipment. Also Russel (1980) concludes that December 1941 was unusually cold.
The German equipment started to fail when the temperature dropped to -20oC (Ziemke 1987). At that temperature the ordinary recoil fluid used by the artillery and anti-tank weapons started to freeze, as did the lubricating oil on small arms and machine guns. This proved disastrous when the Germans had to repel ferocious counter-attacks by Russian infantry. Often only hand grenades would work. Vehicle, aircraft and even locomotive engines became extraordinary difficult to start. Tank turrets would not turn, and truck and tank engines had to be kept running constantly, which meant that a tank which did not move at all still consumed as much fuel in two days as a tank operating in battle normally did in one. In contrast, the Soviet T-34 tank, first encountered in June 1941, but only now beginning to appear in large numbers, had a compressed-air starter which could turn the engine even in the coldest weather (Bellamy 2007). In addition, its very wide tracks spread its weight so that it could roll over ditches and depressions holding 1.5 m of snow.
Just when the sudden temperature drop early December 1941 was beginning to take its toll among the German soldiers still in need of proper winter equipment, the Red Army 5 December launched a massive counterattack on the Moscow front with fresh divisions just arrived from Siberia. The Wehrmacht was pushed back from Moscow. Also the operations near Leningrad further to the northwest were severely affected by the extraordinary cold conditions. Hitler himself for the first time expressed the opinion that it perhaps would be impossible to defeat the USSR (Clark 1995). Never again would the German Wehrmacht be able to take the offensive along the entire eastern front.
It is unclear whether, as was the case with the D-Day landings in France in June 1944, Russian meteorologists were directly involved in the decision of when the Russian counteroffensive should be launched. According to German Intelligence gathered afterwards in 1942, Marshal Timoshenko had reportedly said that the Russians should go over to the attack when the first days of cold had broken the backbone of the German Army. Marshal Zhukov supposedly added that he expected the start and subsequent course of the offensive to depend on freezing off German equipment (Bellamy 2007). Russian meteorologists at that time were among the world leaders in long-range weather forecasting, and it is very likely that the Russian High Command (the Stavka) understood to make use of this meteorological knowledge. At least, from a meteorological point of view, the timing of the Russian counter-offensive at Moscow was perfect.
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Admiral Scheer in the South Atlantic, January 1940 (above left) Map showing the route taken by Admiral Scheer August 1942 (lower left). Map showing temperatures June-August 1942, compared to the average 1900-1929 (right). The high air temperatures within the operational area for Admiral Scheer most likely indicate the presence of much open water. Usually open water in the Arctic affects measured air temperatures more than the other way around. Click here to see a modern example of this open water effect recorded in Svalbard. Temperature data source: NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS).
At
16 August
1942, the reduced sea ice along the Russian coasts of the Arctic Ocean
prompted the German Naval High Command to order the pocket battleship
Admiral
Scheer into the
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1942:
Jakobshavn Isbræ in West Greenland retreats
Frontal positions of calving Jakobshavn Isbræ since 1851, after reaching the maximum Little Ice Age position around 1850 (Bauer et al. 1968). Between 1893 and 1942 the glacier front retreated about 11 km. The early 21st century (2001) glacier front is seen about 4 km east of the 1942 position. According to inuit legends, the embayment Tissarissoq used to be glacier-free in the past and was used as hunting area (Hammer 1883), most likely before before the Little Ice Age glacier advance (Weidick et al. 2004). Picture source: Google Earth.
The Disko Bay region in central West Greenland (c. 70oN) is characterised by large outlet glaciers from the Greenland Ice Sheet (the Indland Ice). The major glacier Jakobshavn Isbræ is situated in a major subglacial valley, which can be traced inland for about 100 km (Echelmeyer et al. 1991). The water depth in the fjord reaches 1500 m in its outer parts (Iken et al. 1993).
Jakobshavn Isbræ is the main outlet glacier from the Greenland Ice Sheet, draining ice from about 6.5% of the total area of the ice sheet, and producing 30-45 km3 icebergs per year. This corresponds to more than 10% of the total output of icebergs from the Greenland Ice Sheet, and the Jakobshavn Isbræ is the most productive glacier in the northern hemisphere. The glacier flow velocity is also high, typically 20-22 meters per day. It is likely that the iceberg which sank Titanic in 1912 may have been produced by Jakobshavn Isbræ.
The first half of the 20th century was characterised by a 11 km frontal retreat of calving Jakobshavn Isbræ, following warming after the end of the Little Ice Age.
A more thorough description of the glacier Jakobshavn Isbræ and of the glacier retreat before 1902 can be found here. A description of the glacier retreat in the early 21st century is found here.
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1942-1943:
Stalingrad, a turning point of the 2nd World War
Map showing the frontline in the Stalingrad area September-October 1942 (left). German soldiers in Stalingrad October 1942 (centre). Front cover of the German newspaper Volkischer Beobachter February 4, 1943, commenting on the surrender of the 6th German Army in Stalingrad (right).
After having reorganised following the setbacks in front of Moscow during the winter 1941-1942, the German Army 28th June 1942 launched Operation Blau (Blue) in southern Russia. Three German armies split the Russian front into fragments on either side of the city Kursk, and General Hoth's eleven Panzer divisions fanned out across hundreds of miles of open rolling corn and steppe grass, towards Voronezh and the Don. Two days later also the southernmost part of the front came alive, and Field Marshal Kleist took the 1st Panzer Army across the Donetz. Soviet forces offered little resistance in the vast empty steppes and retreated eastward in disarray. By the end of July, the Wehrmacht had pushed the Red Army back across the Don River, and was standing shortly west of Stalingrad. On 19th August 1942, the 6th German Army under the command of General Friedrich Paulus reached the outskirts of Stalingrad on the western river bank of Volga, and prepared to take the city by storm.
Russian resistance around Stalingrad was organised by General Zhukov, the man who a year before had organised the frantic Russian defence of Moscow and brought the German assault there to a halt in December 1941. The responsibility of the local defence in Stalingrad was given to another very able commander, General Chuikov. The German advance into the city of Stalingrad slowed considerably down. In Stalingrad the German Army became fatally entangled in a web of street fighting, imposing on the whole army a static process of attrition which was severer than that suffered by its enemies, and to which it was less suited. By mid November, however, German Soldiers had penetrated all the way to the river bank of Volga at several places, and only small areas within Stalingrad were still held by Soviet forces.
Map showing the deviation of the average surface air temperature November 1942, compared to average conditions 1930-1939. Russia and Europe was exposed to low temperatures compared to the meteorological planning horizon for the German invasion of USSR (1930-1939). Also Alaska and western Canada experienced low temperatures, while USA, eastern Canada and Greenland enjoyed above average temperatures. Data source: NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS).
Air temperatures in Russia fell to well below average in November 1942, and most rivers froze up. Since early October General Georgy Zhukov had been planning an offensive on the southern front, with the strategic goal of by way of a pincer operation to isolate the 6th German Army in Stalingrad. The German northern flank was particularly vulnerable, since it was mainly defended by Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian units that suffered from inferior training, equipment, and morale when compared with their German counterparts. This weakness was known and exploited by the Red Army, who preferred to face off against non-German troops whenever it was possible. On the German side, the big river Don was thought to provide a safe protection for their allied troops against crossing of heavy tanks. Because of the low temperatures, however, the ice on the Don was so thick that when the Russian Operation Uranus was launched 19 November, the Russian tanks could cross the river at will. At the same time a thick frost fog covered the battlefield during the first day of the attack, heightening the general panic and confusion of the luckless Italians and Romanians. The Luftwaffe was not up to its previous strength, as substantial units 8 November were removed to counter the American landings in North Africa. Under these circumstances, the Italian and Romanian divisions did not stand a chance of bringing the Soviet offensive to a standstill.
On November 20, a second Soviet offensive was launched to the south of Stalingrad, against points held by the Romanian IV Corps. The Romanian forces, made up primarily of infantry, collapsed almost immediately. The Red Army forces raced west and northwest in a pincer movement. November 23, 1942, the tanks of the Russian 26th Armoured Corps advancing from the northwest captured the big bridge at Kalach west of Stalingrad and joined the Russian infantry that had driven up from the southeast, sealing the ring around Stalingrad. About 260,000 German military personnel were trapped in the pocket. By this they achieved something greater even than the spectacular victory which was promised by the isolation of the German 6th Army. This brilliant stroke marked the complete and final shift in the strategic balance between Soviet and Germany during the 2nd World War.
Instead of ordering an immediate
breakout and retreat from Stalingrad, Hitler ordered the 6th Army to remain at
Volga. Reichmarshal Hermann Göring assured that
the German Luftwaffe would be able to supply the besieged city from the air.
Though Göring's staff
apparently doubted the ability of the Luftwaffe to do anything like this after
the heavy losses sustained in the summer and autumn 1942, their chief assured
Hitler that this was entirely feasible. This
would allow the Germans in the city to fight on while a relief force was
assembled.
Map showing the deviation of the average surface air temperature December 1942 and January 1943, compared to average conditions 1930-1939. In December 1942 Europe, Russia and Siberia enjoyed above average temperatures. In January 1943, however, surface air temperatures in Europe and Russia decreases to well below average temperatures. Only eastern Siberia still enjoyed above average temperatures. Data source: NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS).
The German airlift operation rapidly became a disaster. First of all, suitable airplanes for transporting the huge amount of daily supplies were only at hand in a limited number. The planned airlift operation required a force of 225 serviceable Junkers Ju 52 transports aircrafts. In fact, there was never more than 80 Junkers operational at a time (Clarck 1995). Instead, a number of Heinkel 111 bombers were ordered to participate in the supply operation. These airplanes, however, were constructed for carrying bombs, not spacious loads of food, clothing and other equipment. The transport of fuels, required special containers, which was not at hand, either.
To add to the difficulties, December 1942 in Russia turned out to be rather mild (see diagram above) due to many cyclones travelling across southern Russia. From late November appalling weather conditions spread over the whole of southern Russia with low ceiling, strong winds and snow blizzards. On one hand, the extensive cloud cover made it difficult for the Soviet air force to find and shoot down the German transport planes. On the other hand, the weather made start- and especially landing conditions almost impossible for the German airplanes. Often landings had to be cancelled because of whiteout conditions. The Heinkels, with their weaker undercarriage, often had to confine their mission to making low-level drops. Many of the Junkers broke up on landing or were destroyed by Russian artillery fire. Instead of the 550 tons promised, the air force supplied fewer than 100 ton a day, and considerably below this by the end of December and during January. The largest amount ever brought into Stalingrad in one twenty-four-hour period was 180 tons, on 14th December. After Christmas the daily average fell to about 60 tons.
Soviet forces set up a well-organised air blockade around Stalingrad, while their ground forces fought to capture the remaining German airfields. In less than two months the Luftwaffe lost 488 transport aircrafts and close to 1,000 highly experienced bomber crew personnel (Overy 2006), while German forces in Stalingrad ran short of food, ammunition and medical supplies.
German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein planned a bold overland rescue, Operation Wintergewitter. A relatively small group of German Panzer divisions gathered south of Stalingrad under the command of General Herman Hoth. On 23 December 1942 his mobile forces had managed to puch foreward to a position only 60 km from Stalingrad. At this time, however, the critical supply situation for the 6th Army made Hitler to decide against any attempt of breaking out towards Hoth's Panzer divisions. General Paulus was not the leader to disobey such orders. A renewed Soviet offensive further west made any further German rescue attempts impossible.
Almost at the same time as Operation Wintergewitter was given up, air temperatures began to fall rapidly. The Volga froze solid, allowing the Red Army to supply their forces in Stalingrad more easily. The trapped Germans rapidly ran out of heating fuel and medical supplies, and thousands started dying of frostbite, malnutrition and disease.
January 1943 became very cold (see
diagram above), with air temperatures sinking to -44oC in the
Stalingrad area. Conditions for the surrounded German soldiers rapidly
deteriorated even more. By 17 January the German occupied pocket was less than half the
original size. On 22 January the Soviet forces were able to penetrate into the
western part of the city itself, where one-third of the original German force
dug in. 30 January 1943 the bulk of the remaining German forces with just
promoted Field Marshal
Paulus surrendered. In the northern part of Stalingrad small
remaining German forces refused to accept the surrender and battled on until 2
February where they had nothing left with which to fight. According
to the German documentary film Stalingrad, over 11,000 German and Axis
soldiers refused to lay down their arms at the official surrender. These forces
continued to resist until early March 1943, hiding in cellars and sewers of the
city. By March, what remained of these forces were only small pockets of
resistance that finally surrendered.
The Battle of
Stalingrad was finally at an end, and 91,000 German soldiers became prisoners of
war. Only 5,000 survived their captivity in labor
camps and returned home. The last
handful of survivors were repatriated to Germany in 1955.
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